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• A model of household preventive behaviors in response to malaria prevalence.
• A relatively low price of treatment reduces prevention.
• A relatively high price of treatment does not affect preventive behaviors locally.
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a b s t r a c t
We present a simple theoretical model of household preventive behavior in response to malaria
prevalence. The novelty is to include a trade-off between prevention and treatment in an otherwise
standard epidemiologicalmodel of disease transmission,which depends on the relative price of treatment
with respect to prevention. A relatively low price of treatment reduces prevention.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In spite of the recent decreases in malaria mortality and
morbidity (Feachem et al., 2010; Jamison et al., 2013), this disease
persists in large regions of the world. This can be partly explained
by the high heterogeneity in disease environment. Furthermore,
the relationship between economic development and malaria
✩ We are very grateful to the Fondation pour les Études et Recherches sur le
Développement International, and University Paris 1 for financial support. This
work also benefited from the support of the French National Research Agency, as
part of the program ‘‘Investissements d’avenir’’, ANR-10-LABX-14-01. The usual
caveat applies.∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jean-claude.berthelemy@univ-paris1.fr (J.-C. Berthélemy),
jean.gaudart@univ-amu.fr (J. Gaudart), josselin.thuilliez@univ-paris1.fr
(J. Thuilliez).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.022
0165-1765/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access artic
0/).elimination follows a bidirectional relationship, which has been
extensively discussed in the economic literature. Long-lasting
insecticidal nets (LLINs) have been shown to be efficient preventive
tools leading to ambitious campaigns of LLINs dissemination.
However, in spite of their mechanical and chemical efficiency,
LLINs are partially used by the populations and the efficiency
decreases through time. This hinders malaria elimination. A
malaria trap defined as the result of malaria reinforcing poverty,
while poverty reduces the ability to control malaria, has been
found to be one possible explanation for such paradox (Berthélemy
et al., 2013).
A review of studies on price-elasticity of health products (Bates
et al., 2012), includingmalaria specificmeasures, shows that charg-
ing small fees in an attempt to balance access and ‘‘sustainability’’
maynot be a good solution, as relative to free distribution, as charg-
ing even very small user fees is highly disincentivizing. Behav-
ioral obstacles to elimination of malaria also appear to have been
underestimated. LLINs reduced malaria transmission and child
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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et al., 2005; Toé et al., 2009) that, even in experimental contexts,
the use of bednets remained low.
The second strategy, which has been involved in the malaria
burden decrease, is the access improvement to rapid diagnostic
tests (RDT) and treatment. Actually, artemisinin-based chemother-
apy (ACT) are very efficacious, in spite some recent cases of resis-
tances in Asia (Tulloch et al., 2013).Many countries have pushed up
elimination policies based on free access to ACT. Different studies
have studied the impact of the RDT use or knowledge on behaviors
(Cohen et al., 2012; Adhvaryu, 2014) showing that many patients
are taking ACT even with negative RDT. All studies recommend to
improve both LLIN use and ACT access. But, none have studied the
impact of treatment-based policies on LLIN use.
In this paper, we present a simple theoretical model of pre-
ventive and treatment behavior related to malaria prevalence. The
framework follows the economic epidemiology literature (Philip-
son, 2000; Gersovitz and Hammer, 2003, 2004, 2005). The novelty
is to include a trade-off between prevention and treatment which
depends on the relative cost of treatment with respect to preven-
tion. Such behavioral response was also observed following the
introduction of ARV treatments in the US in 1996 (Geoffard and
Méchoulan, 2004). In this context, the benefit that is associated
with the scaling-up of ARV treatments in terms of a decreased
number of new infections could be at least partly offset by a relapse
in the preventive behaviors among the general population. In ex-
treme scenario, the number of new infections could increase after
a larger diffusion of ARV treatments, similar towhat has beenmod-
eled for the hypothetical release of a vaccine (Blower and McLean,
1994; Bogard and Kuntz, 2002).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly
describes the epidemiological framework. Protection and treat-
ment are added in 3 and 4. Section 5 outlines the main implica-
tions.
2. Standard epidemiological model of malaria transmission
A classical approach was used tomodel transmission of malaria
between human populations and mosquito (Anopheles) popula-
tions (Smith and McKenzie, 2004), based on the McDonald and
Ross malaria transmission model. The following classical assump-
tions have to be beared for both human and mosquito popula-
tions: constant population sizes through time, uniformcontacts, no
superinfection or immunity. The time variation of malaria preva-
lences among human Eq. (1) and mosquito Eq. (2) populations are
defined as follows:
X˙ = mabZ(1− X)− rX (1)
Z˙ = acX(e−gn − Z)− gZ (2)
wherem is the mosquito density (ratio of mosquitoes per human),
a is the number of bits per unit of time and per mosquito, b is the
proportion of infected bites that produce infection among humans,
Z is the proportion of infectious mosquitoes, r is the clearance rate
of malaria in humans, c is the proportion of bites on infectious hu-
mans that produce transmission to mosquitoes, g is the death rate
of mosquitoes, and n is the length of sporogonic cycle.
Assuming that the life-time period of humans is long enough,
malaria prevalence reaches a steady state equilibrium defined by a
concave function Q (X,m) (see Berthélemy et al., 2013), for which
the slope at origin is the basic reproduction rate, R0, and:
Q (0,m) = 0,
Q (1,m) < 1. (3)
The functionQ (X,m) converges towards the trivial disease free
stable steady state, if R0 ≤ 1. This case is not considered in whatfollows, as it does not coincide with the persistence of malaria
in large regions of the developing world. Conversely, Q (X,m)
converges towards a stable steady state characterized by a strictly
positive prevalence of malaria.
3. Economic epidemiological model with protection
The aim of LLIN-based policies is that protection tools such as
LLIN could reduce malaria transmission, leading to a disease free
stable steady state. But these policy only address the problem of
LLIN distribution but rarely the LLIN use. Protection behavior has
been added to the previous epidemiological transmission model,
based on economic mechanisms and fully described in Berthélemy
et al. (2013). Two protective behaviors are defined: LLIN use (h =
1) or no use (h = 0) leading to malaria exposure. It was assumed
that the only mean to prevent from infection is to use a LLIN,
LLIN use was supposed to provide complete protection. These
assumptions can be relaxed without affecting the main findings
of the model (Berthélemy et al., 2013). At any time, depending
on the use of LLIN before, the health status of the individual, can
be susceptible, σ(h) = S, or infected, σ(h) = I . The probability
of being infected at any time, conditionally to the absence of
protection before, can then be written as:
πI = P(σ (h) = I|h = 0) = Q (X,m) (4)
and then:
X = (1− H)πI (5)
where H is the proportion of LLIN use among (1− X) uninfected.
The mosquito density, m, is modified by LLIN use: the exposed
human population decreased, being only the proportion 1 − H
of non-protected population; the absolute number of mosquitoes
decreases with H as LLINs kill mosquitoes (knock down effect).
Hence m, which was a parameter in the pure epidemiological
model, can be written as a function of H as follows:
m(H) = m(0)
1− H (1− γ (H)) (6)
where γ (H) is the proportion of mosquitoes killed by LLINs, an
increasing function of H , and m(0) is the value of mosquito den-
sity in case of no protection. It follows that, at the steady state,
Q (X,m(H)), and then the probability of being infected piI depend
on H .
At the microeconomic level, the choice of protection is deter-
mined by maximizing the expected utility of each individual. The
decision h of protection affects individuals’ utility through two
path: (i) an expected positive impact on the health status in case
of protection and (ii) a private cost, called κ . Protection decision is
described through the following maximization program:
max
h
E[u(σ (h))] − κW (ω)h (7)
whereu(S) oru(I) are the utility levels attached to the health status
(susceptible or infected thus depending on h, the use of a protec-
tion), with 0 < u(I) < u(S); ω is the individual income; W (ω) is
the marginal utility of the income, supposed as usual to decrease
with income. The expected utility (the expected positive impact of
using LLIN on the health status) can be estimated using the follow-
ing probabilities of being susceptible or infected, conditionally to
the use of protection:P(σ (h) = S|h = 1) = 1,
P(σ (h) = S|h = 0) = 1− πI ,
P(σ (h) = I|h = 0) = πI .
(8)
As in standard economic epidemiologicalmodels, the individual
will use protective tools when W (ω) is lower than the expected
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absence of protection:
E[u(σ (1))− u(σ (0))] ≥ κW (ω)h. (9)
Thus protection occurs if and only if:
πI ≥ κW (ω)u(S)− u(I) . (10)
Indeed, a personwill use LLIN if the utility of being non-infected
is greater than the utility of paying for a protective tool, according
to the income and the probability of being infected without using
any protection.
The key point in this approach is that the threshold probability
of infection depends on themarginal income utility loss associated
with using the LLIN, κW (ω). The threshold function, linking πI to
ω, termed C(ω), is monotonic and C ′(ω) < 0. In addition, the
function C() is increasing with κ . Consequently:
h = 1 if ω ≥ C−1(πI),
h = 0 else (11)
and the income threshold conditioning protection, C−1(πI), de-
creases with κ . Knowing individual protection behaviors, the per-
centage of protected persons can be computed as follows:
H =
 +∞
C−1(πI )
f (ω)dω (12)
where f is the probability density function of ω, describing the in-
come distribution of the population. The long term properties of
the model are described in Berthélemy et al. (2013). In the next
section, we include treatment in addition to prevention.
4. Economic epidemiological model with protection and treat-
ment
Until now, we have focused on the dynamics without the pres-
ence of a treatment choice. Assuming that an infected individual
can buy medical treatment at a unit cost, χ , which reduces his/her
illness, then the treatment does not play exactly the same role as
protection. There are two scenari.
• Firstly, malaria chemoprophylaxis is a preventive measure and
can be assimilated to the use of LLINs in the model rather than
to curative measures.
• Secondly, curative measures (or medical treatment in this case)
will not play the same role as protection by LLINs in the model.
Treatment does not have an immediate effect on the infectious
status of the individual but the decision tree changes as, in
subsequent period, the infected individual will decide whether to
buy medical treatment or not. The decision can be considered as
sequential, given that the decision to buymedical treatment is only
taken once infection has been observed. However, the possibility of
buyingmedical treatmentwill affect the protection decision before
infection. A decision variable, η, is therefore introduced, which is
equal to 1 if the individual buys medical treatment and 0 if he/she
does not.
In the subsequent period the treatment decision is represented
as:
η = 1 if and only if u(I|η = 1)− u(I|η = 0) ≥ λW (ω) (13)
where u(I|η = 0) is the value of the health status when infected
and non-treated, u(I|η = 1) is the value of the health status when
infected and treated, with u(I|η = 0) ≤ u(I|η = 1) and λ is
the unit cost of treatment. An individual is susceptible after the
treatment but the value of health is different from u(S) as the
individual has been sick, so that u(S) > u(I|η = 1).There are now two thresholds on πI , depending on the value of
η, denoted Cη(ω), with η = 0 or η = 1.
The condition given in Eq. (13) can be written as:
η = 1 if and only if
ω ≥ W−1

u(I|η = 1)− u(I|η = 0)
λ

. (14)
For simplicity reason, the right-hand side expression is denoted
ω1. It depends only on parameters of themodel (values attached to
different health status) and on the price of treatment. The higher
the price of treatment, the higher ω1, and the smaller the number
of infected individuals who will decide to buy treatment.
Once this second period decision rule has been established,
an individual will choose in the first period to use the protection
device according to a rule comparable to that of the previous
section,
h = 1 if and only if ω ≥ C−1η (πI) for η = 0 or 1 (15)
where C0(ω) = λW (ω)u(S)−u(I|η=0) and C1(ω) = λW (ω)u(S)−u(I|η=1) .
The complete solution then depends on how ω1, C−10 (πI) and
C−11 (πI) compare. From u(I|η = 0) ≤ u(I|η = 1), it can be inferred
that C−10 (πI) ≤ C−11 (πI), ∀πI . Then, there are only three cases to
consider:
• Case 1: ω1 ≤ C−10 (πI) ≤ C−11 (πI)
• Case 2: C−10 (πI) ≤ ω1 ≤ C−11 (πI)
• Case 3: C−10 (πI) ≤ C−11 (πI) ≤ ω1.
For case 1, h = 1 implies η = 1 and is obtained if and only if
C−11 (πI) ≤ ω, implying:
H =
 +∞
C−11 (πI )
f (ω)dω, denoted H1(πI). (16)
For case 2, h = 1 eitherwhen C−11 (πI) ≤ ω (and η = 1) orwhen
C−10 (πI) ≤ ω ≤ ω1 (and η = 0), then:
H = H1(πI)+
 ω1
C−10 (πI )
f (ω)dω. (17)
For case 3, h = 1 when C−10 (πI) ≤ ω (and η = 0), then:
H =
 +∞
C−10 (πI )
f (ω)dω, denoted H0(πI). (18)
Given the definitions of H0(πI) and H1(πI) it is clear that
H1(πI) ≤ H0(πI). Overall, H can be represented as a function of πI
as illustrated in Fig. 1. This function ofπI is continuous everywhere
but not differentiable at C0(ω1) or C0(ω1). For πI ∈ [0, C0(ω1)[, its
partial derivative is equal to:
δH
δπI
= f (C
−1
1 (πI))
C ′1(πI)
. (19)
while for πI ∈ [C0(ω1), C1(ω1)], its partial derivative is equal to:
δH
δπI
= f (C
−1
1 (πI))
C ′1(πI)
− f (C
−1
0 (πI))
C ′0(πI)
. (20)
and for πI ∈ [C1(ω1),+∞[, its partial derivative is equal to:
δH
δπI
= f (C
−1
0 (πI))
C ′0(πI)
. (21)
Fig. 1 illustrates how the model changes in relation with the
introduction of a possible treatment. Specifically, it introduces
changes in the protection behavior depending on the price of
treatment λ. When the price of treatment, λ, increases, ω1
increases and C−10 (πI) and C
−1
1 (πI) decrease.
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5. Conclusions
The main conclusions of the model are the following. First, a
low price of treatment (case 1) implies that individuals will buy
treatment in case of infection, and H = H1(πI). As a consequence
there is less protection than in absence of a treatment, but
protective behaviors are locally invariant with λ.
Second, An intermediate price of treatment (case 2) implies
that some, but not all, infected individuals buy treatment. As
a consequence there is less protection than in absence of a
treatment, and protective behaviors depends positively on λ.
Third, a high price of treatment (case 3) implies that individuals
do not buy treatment when they are infected, and H = H0(πI).
As a consequence the protective behavior is locally the same as in
absence of treatment.
Calibrating the model with known parameters from the litera-
ture constitutes avenues for future research. This could enable us to
show how the results generate different predictions regarding the
equilibrium levels of infection and the usage of treatment and pre-
vention from epidemiologicalmodelswhich do not take this trade-
off explicitly into account.References
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